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FINANCIAL CRISES:









As private capital flows to developing countries surged in the 1990s, financial
crises in emerging market economies have occurred with disturbing and increasing
regularity. The sudden cessation and then reversal of capital flows to Mexico in 1994
caused the first tremors in the global economy, leading to the devaluation of the peso
and deep recession, with direct spillovers into Argentina (the Tequila crisis). The
major financial crisis in East Asia soon followed. The currency crisis in Thailand was
rapidly transmitted to Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Korea, and its impact
ramified throughout the global economy. Since then, the emerging markets have
experienced a steady series of aftershocks: in 1998 and 1999 capital flow reversals
induced currency devaluations in Russia (August 1998) and Brazil (January 1999), and
most recently recession, devaluation, and default in Argentina (2002), as well as reces-
sions and payments problems in Uruguay and Ecuador (2002). Though the region has
since recovered, East Asia’s crisis remains the most severe in its depth and regional
breadth.
In the years since it occurred, attempts to understand the East Asia crisis have
provided a treasure trove of studies that illuminate various causes of financial crises.
Though they differ in emphasis, an emerging consensus points to four mounting vul-
nerabilities in Thailand, Indonesia, Korea, and Malaysia.1 First, the global economy
spawned an unprecedentedly large surge in private capital flows in the 1990s, espe-
cially short-term flows, as deregulated banks in the rich countries scanned the globe
for higher return opportunities, and East Asia looked particularly attractive with its
low debt ratios, rapid growth, and stable exchange rates [World Bank, 2000b; 2001].186 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
Second, macroeconomic policies in East Asia took advantage of this boom to facilitate
large inflows of short-term, unhedged, foreign currency-denominated capital, fueling
a domestic credit boom and even more rapid growth [World Bank, 2000a]. Third,
many countries had liberalized their domestic financial sectors, but without sufficient
regulation, and domestic banks supplied cheap capital to already highly leveraged
corporations that took on easily available credit [Claessens, Djankov, and Lang, 1998].
Finally, politics, at first stable, introduced new risks that culminated in important
changes at precisely the time when internal financial vulnerabilities were becoming
worrisome [Haggard, 2000]. A combination of the first three factors led to
overinvestment in domestic nontradable sectors—manifested as property price bubbles,
especially in Thailand and Malaysia—and in selected inefficient manufacturing sec-
tors—as was done by Indonesian group firms and Korean chaebol firms. Availability of
cheap capital that was poorly intermediated through weakly supervised and governed
financial institutions allowed corporations to add debt to their already highly lever-
aged balance sheets. As one country entered crisis, investors examined other coun-
tries for similarities and shifted portfolios, or were compelled to do so as the first
country’s demise raised risk on the whole class of investment, producing contagion
[Calvo, 1998; Dornbusch, Park, and Claessens, 2000].2 The fourth factor aggravated
this process. The devaluation of the Thai baht in July 1997 triggered a gathering panic
among investors that led to probably one of the most massive outflows of capital from
any developing region in human history. More than US$100 billion were withdrawn
from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries and Korea in the
space of only 18 months after the Thai baht devaluation.
The East Asian experience has left in its wake an abundance of new research that
allows us not only to understand the nature of financial crises better, but to begin to
draw out generalized lessons for policy, associated trade-offs, and constraints to ready
implementation. In this paper, we summarize the literature on what we believe are
nine interrelated and general policy lessons from the East Asian crisis and we analyze
the difficulties encountered in establishing those policies. Abstracting general lessons
is not easy because each crisis differs in its timing, its specific economic and political
circumstances, its global economic conditions, and its associated policy causes and
responses. This challenge compels us to raise the discussion to a higher level of gen-
erality than would satisfy policy makers confronting a crisis, but it will tease out the
important variables, and indicate the literature and policy directions that they would
have to consider. We divide the lessons into four sections for examination: preventing
crises, managing crises, resolving the systemic consequences of crises, and construct-
ing a new international financial architecture, including a regional focus. Table 1
presents a schematic overview.187 FINANCIAL CRISES: NINE LESSONS FROM EAST ASIA
TABLE 1
Summary of Nine Policy Lessons
Objective National Measures Global Measures Regional Measures
Improve mechanisms Improve mechanisms 9. Improve mechanisms
for crisis prevention, for crisis prevention, for crisis prevention,
management and management and management and
resolution at the resolution at the resolution at the
national level. global level. regional level in a
way consistent with
the global framework.
Preventing or 1. Avoid large current account deficits financed
reducing the through short-term, unhedged capital inflows.
risk of crises · Secure adequate foreign · Strengthen IMF · Strengthen regional
exchange reserves. surveillance. policy dialogue and
· Maintain sound fiscal & surveillance.
monetary policy. · Coordinate monetary
· Adopt a viable exchange and exchange rate
rate regime. policy.
· Establish orderly capital
account liberalization.
2. Aggressively regulate and supervise financial
systems to ensure that financial institutions
manage risks prudently.
· Strengthen regulatory & · Tighten regulations over
supervisory frameworks financial institutions that
over financial institutions. lend to highly leveraged





· Introduce limited deposit
insurance.
3. Erect an incentive structure for sound corporate
finance to avoid high leverage and excessive
reliance on foreign borrowing.
· Establish good corporate
governance.
· Introduce greater compe-
tition to product, factor &
financial markets.




Managing 4. Mobilize timely external liquidity of sufficient
crises magnitude.
· Restore market confidence · Strengthen IMF liquidity · Establish a regional
· Reduce moral hazard. support. facility for liquidity
problems. support.
5. Do not adopt a one-size-fits-all prescription for
monetary and fiscal policy.
· Adopt appropriate mone- · Strengthen regional
tary and fiscal policy con- capacity to formulate
tingent on the specific needed adjustment
conditions of the economy. policies.188 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
TABLE 1
Summary of Nine Policy Lessons—Continued
Objective National Measures Global Measures Regional Measures
Managing 6. Bail-in private international investors.
crises— · Impose official standstills. · Establish international · Involve international
(continued) · In extreme cases, allow rules of the game creditors from outside
involuntary  private through private sector the region.
sector involvement. involvement.
Resolving the 7. Move swiftly to establish resolution mechanisms
systemic for impaired assets and liabilities of banks and
consequences corporations.
of crises · Establish procedures for · Establish international · Finance regional pro-
bank exits, recapitaliza- frameworks for private grams to help resolve
tion, and rehabilitation. sector involvement in the systemic impact
· Establish frameworks for external debt resolution. of crises through the
corporate insolvencies & regional MDBs and
workouts. bilateral donors
8. Cushion the effects of crises on low-income
groups through social policies to ameliorate the
inevitable social tensions.
· Strengthen social safety · Finance the activity
nets to mitigate social through the MDBs and
consequences of crises. bilateral donors.
PREVENTING CRISES
In a world of free capital mobility, speculative attacks on currencies can occur
whenever confidence is lost. Moreover, a currency crisis in a foreign country can
rapidly trigger a crisis at home. Crisis prevention attempts to lower the probability of
having a crisis and to reduce ex ante the risk factors.
In retrospect, three factors combined to increase East Asia’s vulnerability: the
rise in external private indebtedness—mainly short-term and unhedged; the asset-
liability mismatch in the financial system together with its low return intermediation;
and the highly leveraged financial position of corporations. The first factor is related
to macroeconomic policy, the second to financial sector policy, and the third to corpo-
rate governance. Each area provides a lesson for the future.
Lesson 1: Avoid large current account deficits financed through short-term,
unhedged private capital inflows.
Several policy domains affect the net external liability position of a country and its
propensity toward crises. In East Asia, it is instructive to review several interrelated
macroeconomic policies: foreign exchange reserves, fiscal and monetary policy, exchange
rate policy, and policy toward the capital account.
Foreign Exchange Reserve Policy. As capital movements have become larger,
foreign exchange reserves have become an increasingly important line of defense.
The adequacy of foreign exchange reserves can no longer be measured by their cover-
age of imports, but by the magnitude of potential capital outflows. Guidotti [1999]189 FINANCIAL CRISES: NINE LESSONS FROM EAST ASIA
concludes that reserves should equal the amount of capital contractually due in the
coming year. But reserves should arguably be larger if current account deficits are
large (for example, more than 2 percent of GDP), if the exchange rate is fixed and
hence more vulnerable to shocks, or if the economy has a historical tendency toward
instability (for example, because of commodity dependence and chronic terms of trade
shocks [World Bank, 2000b]). Needless to say, the optimal amount of reserves must
also be judged against the opportunity cost of carrying them.
Fiscal and Monetary Policy. In the case of the affected East Asian economies,
fiscal policy was disciplined and monetary policy was non-inflationary until the mid-
1990s. But in Thailand, fiscal policy became pro-cyclical in an attempt to stave off a
slowdown in the quarters immediately preceding the crisis. The country continued to
face mounting current account deficits in 1996, investor perceptions began to shift
against local assets, and capital inflows began to attenuate. Authorities tried to extend
the growth cycle, but fiscal stimulus, instead of increasing output, was transmitted
mainly to the balance of payments through rising imports and more outflows in the
capital account, worsening the external balance and pressuring the peg (World Bank [2000a]).
With the benefit of hindsight, we can now conclude that to reduce vulnerabilities
and the probability of crisis in Thailand, macroeconomic policy in 1996 should have
reigned in aggregated demand, avoided excessive credit expansion in the domestic
economy, and curtailed the excessive external reliance on foreign savings. This would
have slowed the expansion, but reduced the extent of real effective overvaluation and
the current account deficit, and slowed the buildup of short-term external debt rela-
tive to foreign exchange reserves.3
Monetary policy should have maintained consistency with the de facto pegged
exchange rate arrangement in the pre-crisis period. This policy would have implied
lower credit growth and higher interest rates when capital inflows began to taper off.
Restrictive monetary policy in the period immediately preceding the crisis, especially
if coupled with a neutral or even contractionary fiscal stance, might have preempted
the currency run that eventually came.
Exchange Rate Policy. Countries with large current account deficits are depen-
dent on capital inflows to maintain their external balance. If investors lose confidence
in a currency value, however, capital inflows can stop abruptly and capital outflows
can take place in massive amounts. In the face of sudden shocks to capital flows and
currency markets, the country may be forced to adopt a contractionary monetary
policy and to curtail the economic activity sustained by capital inflows. It is therefore
important to maintain a viable exchange rate regime, with a consistent monetary and
fiscal policy framework in order to deter speculative attacks and thus avoid “sudden
stops” [Calvo, 1998; Kawai, 1999]. A viable exchange rate regime has sufficient flexibil-
ity to adjust to external shocks, which is typically obtained with some degree of exchange
rate flexibility or with flexibility in domestic prices, including wages.4
In the case of East Asia, several economies had maintained stable exchange rates
vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar until the crisis. For example, Thailand had its baht pegged to
a basket of currencies, with the U.S. dollar having a dominant weight. Other coun-
tries also had their currencies de facto pegged to the dollar. This was widely perceived190 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
as an official guarantee to minimize currency risk and to encourage trade, foreign
direct investment (FDI), and other capital inflows. U.S. dollar appreciation since 1995,
against currencies of other major industrialized countries, particularly against the
Japanese yen, may have contributed to a perception of unsustainable exchange rates
in East Asia.5
Capital Account Liberalization. The East Asian crisis has shown that capital
account liberalization that provides financial institutions with access to cheap foreign
savings can set the stage for asset-liability mismatches. Unfettered capital mobility
may be dangerous if the regulatory and supervisory policy framework is weak and if
domestic financial and corporate sectors cannot manage risks prudently.
Some countries have adopted explicit capital controls as a way to isolate the domes-
tic economy from the volatility of global financial cycles [Calvo and Reinhart, 2000;
Kawai, 1998; World Bank, 2000b]. Restrictions on capital inflows usually have the
objective of curtailing excessive short-term inflows through taxation of foreign loans
with a short maturity—usually less than 12 months;6 higher reserve or liquidity require-
ments [Dooley, 1996; Reinhart and Reinhart, 1999]; or imposition of outright controls.
The case of the Chilean controls received the most attention in the literature and
among policy makers. The controls required that, to bring short-term capital to the
country, a certain proportion of the funds had to be put aside in the form of
nonremunerative reserves, thereby raising the cost of borrowing short-term foreign
capital. As discussed below, a similar type of inflow control can be exercised as part of
prudential regulation over banks and corporations, and these regulations can have
the same effect as the capital controls.
Pitfalls. It has not been easy to implement these policies. Regarding foreign
exchange reserves, it is difficult to calculate the right amount of reserves needed. It is
fair to say that policy makers, including international financial institutions, have tended
to underestimate the amount needed to cope with external vulnerability. Also, when-
ever the volume of reserves is perceived to be high, there are large pressures to use
them for many urgent needs, rather than allow them to accumulate to withstand
eventual speculative attacks.
With respect to monetary and fiscal policy, though it would be ideal to follow
counter-cyclical policies, there are several obstacles to doing so. First, it is not a
straightforward task to determine in which part of the cycle an economy is. Second,
there are few political-economy incentives to make adjustment during boom years.
One way to achieve these policies is through a predetermined set of rules that bind
policy makers—though these rules can always be changed.
The effect of capital controls seems to diminish progressively as investors learn of
ways to circumvent the legislation, requiring successive efforts at expanding the com-
prehensiveness of the control regime. The ways in which controls are circumvented
and become ineffective over time have been documented in a series of studies [Edwards,
1999; Gallego, Hernandez, and Schmidt-Hebbel, 1999; Edison and Reinhart, 2001;
Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2001].191 FINANCIAL CRISES: NINE LESSONS FROM EAST ASIA
Lesson 2: Aggressively regulate and supervise financial systems to ensure
that banks manage risks prudently.
In the run-up to the crisis, East Asian banks developed large asset-liability mis-
matches—unhedged foreign exchange borrowings invested in nontradable sectors and
short-term funds lent long into property—all of which left the banks vulnerable to
exchange depreciations and to interest rate surges. This vulnerability reflected the
fact that domestic financial systems were not well-regulated or governed when capital
account liberalization was accelerated in the first half of the 1990s. Regulatory and
supervisory frameworks over financial institutions were weak in risk-management
and the capital base—together with loan classification and loan loss provisions. Moral
hazard was created because of explicit or implicit government guarantees to indi-
vidual financial institutions [Goldstein and Turner, 1996; Demirguc-Kunt and
Detragiache, 1998; Eichengreen and Rose, 2001].
Having a resilient and robust financial sector is key to avoiding crises. First, as a
preventive measure, countries with resilient and robust financial sectors will prob-
ably suffer less from contagion. Second, these countries will have more flexibility to
cope with external shocks and to take corrective measures during a crisis. Countries
with a solvent banking sector and low corporate leverage ratios will be able to raise
interest rates to contain speculative currency attacks.7
Policies that can achieve this financial structure include: prudential regulation of
asset-liability mismatches and portfolio and loan standards that adhere to internation-
ally accepted norms; capital adequacy regulations that, at a minimum, match those
that are required under Basle standards; clear governance rules to prevent insider
and group lending not subject to loan evaluation and creditworthiness and standards;
transparency for investors and depositors through mandatory public disclosure of audited
financial statements; and, finally, deposit insurance limited to a minimal share of
private liabilities to bound government contingent liabilities in event of crisis, and
share risk with investors and depositors (see, for example, Stiglitz and Bhattacharya
[2000]).8
At least two clarifications are warranted with respect to these policies. First, a
prudential regulation can be used as a complement to capital controls, with the gov-
ernment requiring commercial banks to put aside a certain proportion of the short-
term funds borrowed abroad in the form of reserves. The idea behind this type of
controls is to lengthen the maturity structure of capital inflows by making short-term
borrowing from abroad more expensive than long-term borrowing, in light of the view
that short-term capital inflows can be risky. Second, the limited nature of the deposit
insurance is intended to reduce moral hazard. If a commercial bank makes risky
investments, then depositors may shift their deposits away from such banks to less
risky banks, thereby disciplining the behavior of both commercial banks and deposi-
tors. Deposit insurance can limit the disciplinary effect of deposit shifts, as depositors
do not need to respond fully to bank risk taking. A limited, as opposed to a broad,
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Pitfalls. As a measure to manage capital flows, prudential regulation can be less
distortionary and less subject to evasion than other tools like capital controls, but it
also tends to be less comprehensive. As discussed below, prudential regulation over
financial institutions does not prevent direct corporate borrowing of the type preva-
lent in Indonesia, but it does wall off the financial sector from the largest contingent
risk to the treasury. Another potential difficulty of supervising the financial system is
that developing countries do not usually have the expertise or enough resources to
hire good supervisors [Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 2002]. To complement the oversight
of the financial system by regulators and supervisors, countries can use markets by
encouraging market discipline and other market participants like rating agencies [World
Bank, 2001]. Market discipline requires access and transparency of information, how-
ever, such that the problems of asymmetric information are minimized. Perhaps,
more effective surveillance through the IMF’s Article IV consultation might help in
achieving more transparency. The issue of transparency is also crucial for the corpo-
rate sector as discussed in the next lesson.
Prudential regulation over financial institutions also means costs, including less
comprehensiveness without covering direct corporate borrowing; higher domestic short-
term interest rates; and possible evasion of the controls if imposed for a long period of
time. Regarding deposit insurance, though government can set up limited deposit
insurance schemes ex ante, such schemes are seldom credible in developing countries
due to the systemic nature of crises and due to the limited funds available to back
them [Martinez  Peria and Schmukler, 2001].
Lesson 3: Erect an incentive structure for sound corporate finance to avoid
high leverage ratios and excessive reliance on foreign borrowing.
The experience in East Asia shows that highly leveraged and vulnerable corporate
sectors were a key determinant of the depth of the crisis. As economic growth remained
high, it concealed the negative effects of inefficient resource allocation while insider
financial flows without due diligence did not create problems. But as the economies
went into crisis, the problems associated with bad corporate governance were exposed.
Currency devaluation suddenly inflated the size of external debt—measured in terms
of the domestic currency—and debt service obligations and high interest rates also
sharply increased domestic debt service obligations of the corporations, driving the
domestic corporations into financial distress. These vulnerabilities affected the banks
with exposure to the corporations. This created a liquidity crunch and deepened the
recessionary pressures, which in turn hurt the corporate sector even more. The pres-
ence of a disciplined corporate sector with sustainable debt-to-equity ratios is thus
important to weathering exchange rate and interest rate shocks. Several building
blocks are essential to an incentive framework for sound corporate finance: clear
rules of corporate governance, improved competition policies, deep corporate capital
markets, and information transparency.
Corporate Governance. New rules of corporate governance must be established
to reduce conglomerate structures, that is, concentrated holdings in a few families,
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web of insider financial flows with minimal due diligence in lending and inadequate
corporate oversight. Rules that require good accounting, auditing, and information
disclosure protect minority shareholders and strengthen creditor rights, which can
prevent the buildup of huge debt positions on narrow capital positions.
Competition Policy. Improvement of competition policies both in capital mar-
kets and in product/factor markets can also strengthen corporate discipline. In addi-
tion, creating and enforcing domestic bankruptcy legislations would strengthen corpo-
rate governance. Though greater competition does not completely eliminate corpo-
rate misbehavior—as evidenced by recent scandals in the U.S., beginning with Enron—
it calls for greater efficiency and better resource allocation due to market pressure for
firm survival, thus limiting the extent of misbehavior.
Corporate Equity and Bond Markets. One of the gaps in the financing and
governance regimes in crisis-affected East Asia was the stunted development of corpo-
rate equity and bond markets. Equity markets are an important source of capital, but
the reluctance of family owners and insiders to dilute their ownership share often fed
their decision to seek easy bank financing, often from banks they controlled. At the
same time, the absence of adequate disclosure and other protections for minority
shareholders has led many investors to eschew investment in their domestic mar-
kets. Similarly, bond markets provide constant and instant market evaluation of debt
value and, hence, provide an essential signaling function to financial investors. In the
absence of bond markets, however, banks had no reason to market their loans to
corporations, and corporations had one less reason to alter their performance to become
more efficient. Corporations could thus develop unsustainable, high debt-equity ratios.
The policies that might help develop corporate equity and bond markets include: regu-
latory capacity to implement full disclosure and contract enforcement, protection of
minority shareholder rights and bondholder rights, and neutral tax policies to elimi-
nate any bias in favor of bank finance over capital market finance.
Information Disclosure. Much of the overlending prior to the East Asian crisis
might not have occurred had international lenders correctly appraised the actual bal-
ance sheets of borrowing corporations. Many investors tried to undertake due dili-
gence, but without accurate information. Because it was costly to gather, many inves-
tors did not spend resources to obtain valuable information, relied on superficial reviews
by others, and simply followed the herd. Better information disclosure can help miti-
gate this problem, particularly among relatively uninformed international investors,
and can guide them to efficient investment decisions, if sufficient incentives are cre-
ated to use such information.
Pitfalls. Establishing policies for obtaining adequate corporate governance, fos-
tering competition, developing capital markets, and encouraging information disclo-
sure might be more difficult than it sounds. As Rajan and Zingales [2003] argue, well-
established firms may oppose the development of the financial system, as it breeds
competition and reduces their advantage. Moreover, in the post-Enron period, it is
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standards with international “best practices,” and having competitive accounting/auditing
industries would not be enough. Rather, policy makers have to ensure adequate over-
sight and enforcement and pay due attention to the incentives governing both the
auditors and the firms—and even these may not be sufficient to guarantee full infor-
mation disclosure. Finally, capital market-based finance in developing countries can
lead to a short-term financial structure, which might reduce productive investment.
Still, many emerging market economies are heavily bank based and short-termism
can also occur in a bank-based system.
MANAGING CRISES
Once a country is affected by a crisis, its policy objective must focus on preventing
it from developing into a more serious economic and social crisis with systemic pro-
portions. Policy options, however, are highly constrained by: a country’s initial condi-
tions—including the initial level of public sector debt; fiscal policy headroom; the com-
position of domestic and foreign currency debt owed by private financial institutions
and corporations; bargaining powers of, and relationships between, domestic debtors
and domestic and foreign creditors; and the government’s relations with foreign credi-
tors. In general, policies that restore the country’s credibility should be pursued. Strat-
egies for crisis management include both international and national responses. Inter-
national responses include the provision of international liquidity from outside—such
as through the IMF—and internationally coordinated private sector involvement.
National responses include appropriate monetary and fiscal policy and possible involun-
tary private sector involvement—or unilateral standstills or capital outflow controls.
Lesson 4: Mobilize timely external liquidity of sufficient magnitude in a
context of sound policies to restore market confidence.
In the face of a crisis, whether induced by fundamentals or nonfundamental herd
behavior, governments have no choice but swiftly to seek liquidity to staunch a run on
its domestic assets. The availability of large amounts of liquidity rapidly to head off
currency crises is an obvious benefit if they most likely result from irrational herd
behavior. This liquidity usually comes from the IMF. Given the recent magnitude of
capital outflows, governments of crisis-affected countries could be faulted for not rec-
ognizing the seriousness of the crisis or not moving rapidly to bring in the IMF.
International interventions, however, have received criticisms from two different
camps. One camp of critics, who argue that the IMF should play an international
lender of last resort function, insists that the amount of international liquidity pro-
vided so far has been too small and often too late to contain a crisis or contagion.
According to this view, to prevent a liquidity crisis from evolving into a serious sol-
vency crisis, international liquidity must be provided quickly and abundantly. Another
camp of critics, who argue that IMF interventions create moral hazard problems,
insists that the rescue packages may create perverse incentives that heighten risk of
crisis: for governments to run excessively risky policies and for international inves-
tors to underestimate the true risk of investing in emerging markets [Krugman, 1998].
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considerable adjustment efforts on the part of the crisis country as well as appropriate
burden sharing on the part of international investors.9 The latter, whose participation
is called “private sector involvement,” forces international investors to share the costs
as a penalty for imprudent risk taking.
Pitfalls. Though intellectual support for transforming the IMF into a genuine
international lender of last resort is strong (provided that the potential for moral
hazard is minimized), the G-7 countries have found it impractical and unrealistic due
to the need to increase dramatically the amount of resources available in times of
crises and contagion. The international community instead has taken an incremental-
ist approach to liquidity enhancement through the creation of the Supplemental Reserve
Facility (SRF) and the Contingent Credit Line (CCL). Nonetheless, no country has
decided to use the IMF CCL, as there is clearly an incentive compatibility problem. As
long as the CCL is a voluntary arrangement, no country would be interested in agree-
ing to the CCL because of the fear of being perceived as “problematic.” If the CCL is
made into a mandatory arrangement for all emerging market economies—as deposit
insurance is for all commercial banks—then many economies would wish to be certi-
fied by the IMF as “good” and, hence, eligible for CCL arrangements. However, some
economies would inevitably fail to be certified as “good.” Economies that are initially
certified as “good” may also slip to a “bad” status at a later stage, which would send the
signal that the country in question has serious problems. Since it is impossible for the
IMF to require those “bad” economies to exit or to refrain from borrowing abroad—
which is possible in the case of “bad” commercial banks because the regulator can take
away the bank licenses—these potentially “bad” economies would certainly object to
the introduction of the CCL.
Lesson 5: There is no one-size-fits-all prescription for monetary and fiscal
policy in response to crises.
The conduct of monetary and fiscal policy had been at the center of the policy
debate during the early phase of the East Asian crisis. The debate focused on whether
contractionary monetary and fiscal policies could stabilize financial markets or pre-
cipitate a collapse in output and financial markets.
Monetary Policy: “Your money or Your Banks.” Contractionary monetary policy
raises interest rates on domestic currency denominated assets and increases the cost
of speculation, thereby discouraging capital outflows or encouraging inflows. More-
over, a contractionary monetary policy is a signal to markets of the government’s
willingness to defend the exchange rate. This creates a dilemma, however. High inter-
est rates debilitate a weak banking sector and increase the cost of borrowing and debt
servicing for indebted corporations.10
The evidence provides mixed results in the policy debate—see, for example,
Kaminsky and Schmukler [1999], Baig and Goldfajn [2002], and Kraay [2003]. In econo-
mies with heavily leveraged corporations and weak banks, tight monetary policy encoun-
ters a severe trade-off between maintaining the value of currencies and maintaining
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domestic currency, as was the case with Korea, a high interest rate is detrimental to
the corporate sector. If corporations are highly indebted in foreign currency, as was
the case with Indonesia, currency depreciation is detrimental to corporate health. A
high interest rate policy that attempts to support the exchange rate makes sense,
therefore, if the country’s external debt is high and domestic debt is low, and vice
versa. Governments in East Asia under these circumstances vacillated between tight-
ening monetary conditions to protect the exchange rate at the cost of impending sys-
temic bankruptcies and providing liquidity to banks that were stressed at the cost of
plummeting exchange rates and inflationary surges.11
Fiscal Policy: “Can You Finance It?” Supporters of tight government budgets
argue that this generates credibility by signaling to investors a willingness to control
inflation, facilitate current account adjustment (through contractionary impacts), and
mobilize public resources for financial sector restructuring—to cover any new debt
burden that may result from deposit guarantees, bank recapitalization, and assump-
tion of other financial sector liabilities. Others argue that tight fiscal policy aggravates
the crisis by further reducing aggregate demand in addition to the effects of the devalua-
tion that usually accompany crises. Reducing net public spending thus intensifies the
vulnerabilities of the banking and corporate sectors, worsening the emerging crisis.12
The appropriate policy stance depends on three factors: the cause of the crisis, the
fiscal headroom available before the crisis, and the willingness of the private sector to
finance government deficits. When the crisis country has a favorable fiscal position in
the pre-crisis period—low public sector debt and hence credible headroom for fiscal
policy, as well as large domestic savings that can be tapped to finance a budget defi-
cit—the government has the luxury of a more expansive fiscal policy to support aggre-
gate demand and to provide leeway to vulnerable banks. Contractionary fiscal policy
makes sense if the cause of the crisis is government overspending and if the economy’s
activity level is not severely damaged. When the government has little domestic fiscal
headroom or faces constraints to external financing on market terms, the country can
still have some access to resources from the multilateral development banks (MDBs)—
such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the Inter-American Devel-
opment Bank.13
Pitfalls. Perhaps the major drawback of this lesson is that the disagreement
about which policies to pursue increases in the midst of crises, making it difficult to
implement the right policies promptly and leading to trials and errors that can be
costly. Moreover, pursuing economic adjustments at times of crises can be politically
and socially costly. Finally, the arguments above collectively suggest that the best
mix of monetary, exchange rate, fiscal, and debt policies depends on the structure of
public and private debt, the degree of external support, and, most importantly, domes-
tic politics [Haggard, 2000]. No single, painless policy will quickly restore investor
confidence.197 FINANCIAL CRISES: NINE LESSONS FROM EAST ASIA
Lesson 6: Bailing-in private international creditors at times of crisis is
essential. In those cases when official resources are limited relative to the
magnitude of the crisis and private creditors are not amenable to
coordination, some involuntary private sector involvement may be necessary.
When IMF liquidity support is provided in response to a crisis, it is essential to
involve private international creditors by encouraging them to agree on a “standstill,”
which entails a suspension of payments on external debt and a debt restructuring
negotiation that may eventually lead to rollover, extension of maturities, and interest
or debt reductions. In the case of commercial bank loans, coordination between a
limited number of international creditor banks and domestic debtor banks can rela-
tively easily result in an agreement on temporary standstills on repayments.14
Official standstill provisions in the form of a temporary suspension of debt pay-
ments can constitute an integral part of crisis management [World Bank, 1998a]. This
procedure functions as a floodgate that helps stop the decline in the currency value
and enables the authorities to buy time to put in place a credible adjustment program
and to organize creditor-debtor negotiations. If combined with appropriate, early debt
workout agreements, this arrangement could result in better outcomes for both the
debtor economy and the creditors.
To facilitate sovereign debt resolution, two approaches have been proposed: the
contractual approach and the statutory approach. The contractual approach suggests
the inclusion of collective action clauses in sovereign bond contracts so as to allow
quick and orderly processes of bond restructuring in the event of insolvency. The
statutory approach, notably the “sovereign debt restructuring mechanism” proposed
by Krueger [2002], requires legal changes or treaties to allow all types of sovereign
debt to be resolved in the event of a debt sustainability crisis. Some important progress
has been made in the area of collective action clauses. This practice needs to go beyond
sovereign bonds and cover private debt because of the rising importance of private-to-
private investment, as was the case in Asia.
Pitfalls. Bailing-in the private sector is not always easy. First, in the case of
emerging economy bonds, agreeing on standstills in the event of emergencies would
be more difficult because of the large number of bondholders involved and their dis-
persion. This difficulty is real because most of the financial flows to emerging markets
now take the form of bond issues. For such bonds, developing collective action clauses
or debt restructuring mechanisms would obligate bondholders to accept rules of the
game—including standstills, rollovers, and restructuring—because they enhance the
predictability and the pace of debt restructuring in the event of a crisis. Still, agree-
ment on these mechanisms is not easy to achieve across market participants in differ-
ent parts of the world. A second difficulty of bailing-in is that it may be hard to adopt a
rules-based system because of the specific nature of country and market circumstances.
Until international bankruptcy procedures are put in place, official debt standstills
had better be invoked on a case-by-case basis.198 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
RESOLVING THE SYSTEMIC CONSEQUENCES OF CRISES
The final focus of policy makers should be on strengthening crisis resolution mecha-
nisms that would create conditions for early resolution of the systemic consequences
of a crisis and initiation and acceleration of the recovery process.  Such mechanisms
include the establishment of frameworks for dealing with nonviable banks and non-
bank financial institutions (NBFIs), the strengthening of domestic corporate insol-
vency procedures, the development of international debt-restructuring arrangements—
as mentioned in Lesson 6—and the improvement of the social safety net. The basic
frameworks of these mechanisms need to be put in place before a systemic crisis
occurs, that is, at normal times, rather than at times of a crisis, because their design-
ing and development take time.
Lesson 7: Move swiftly to establish domestic and international resolution
mechanisms for impaired assets and liabilities of nonviable banks and
corporations.
First, domestic procedures of banking sector resolution were often inadequate in
East Asia. Resolution of weak banks and NBFIs should involve the following proce-
dures: diagnostic reviews of bank portfolios that are based on internationally accepted
classification rules and accounting principles; identification of viable and nonviable
banks; resolution of nonviable banks—through liquidation, closure, temporary nation-
alization, or merger and acquisition—with a view to protecting depositors and viable
corporate borrowers; establishment of official asset management companies (AMCs)
to carve out nonperforming loans (NPLs) from weak or closed financial institutions;
and recapitalization of viable banks after full provisioning and reevaluation of NPLs at
fair market prices and realistic recovery rates. Emerging market economies must
introduce such resolution procedures so as to resolve effectively the systemic impacts
of a crisis and to accelerate the recovery process. These procedures should keep a
medium-term objective of restoring healthy financial and corporate sectors, within a
long-term version of reforming the financial and corporate structures.
Second, in East Asia domestic insolvency procedures of corporations were also
inadequate for private creditors and debtors to reach agreements. Insolvency proce-
dures include: the establishment of effective bankruptcy; reorganization and foreclo-
sure laws for creditors wishing to take legal action to recover assets; creation of enabling
environments for corporate restructuring; the introduction of “London rules” types of
voluntary out-of-court frameworks for corporate restructuring; and the empowerment
of the official AMCs to dispose of and restructure the acquired assets and/or debtor
corporations. Enabling environments tend to provide creditors and debtors with suffi-
cient incentives (sticks and carrots) to implement voluntary workout through either
of two methods: eliminating legal, tax, and regulatory impediments to corporate restructur-
ing, or introducing tax or other incentives for it. The presence of deep capital markets
is also helpful in facilitating corporate restructuring through securitization of corpo-
rate assets and price discovery in the market.
Finally, internationally supported arrangements for orderly debt workout must
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become insolvent or cannot meet debt-servicing obligations to their creditors. These
arrangements are designed to enable debtors and creditors to share the costs of crisis
resolution, rather than leaving borrowers with all of the consequences, and would
take the form of a contractual or a statutory approach as described in Lesson 6. Though
usually costly and time consuming, these procedures are critical institutional mecha-
nisms to avoid more costly solutions and would become truly effective if extended
from sovereign to private debt. The East Asian experience shows that, as long as a
country’s external debt, particularly private corporate debt, is not resolved, its bank-
ing sector remains unprofitable and economic stagnation tends to be prolonged.
Pitfalls. The drawback with these lessons is that the mechanisms mentioned
above should be established before crises happen. Experience shows that these mecha-
nisms are rarely set up ex ante, as the incentives are not present to prepare for bad
times. Once a crisis erupts, liquidation of banks and corporations tends to be delayed,
because of the difficulty of disentangling liquidity from solvency crises. Also, at that
time, it is hard to establish those resolution mechanisms, as authorities are focused
on managing short-run problems.
Even introducing such mechanisms ex ante would not be easy. They would cer-
tainly require financial, accounting, legal, and judiciary expertise, which is lacking in
most emerging market economies. Strong enforcement of laws through the judiciary
process and the presence of effective regulatory and supervisory frameworks would
demand such expertise. Governments would have to pay lucrative salaries to judges
and to other public officers overseeing the regulatory and supervisory frameworks in
order to attract highly competent experts and to avoid corruption.
Lesson 8: Cushion the effects of crises on low-income groups through social
policies to ameliorate the inevitable social tensions associated with
adjustment.
The disruption and enormous social costs witnessed in the aftermath of economic
crises have highlighted the need to address the social vulnerability exposed by crises.
Without such attention, a crisis would be accompanied by excessively large adjust-
ment costs, especially for the poor and the vulnerable segments of society, with long-
term and often irreversible impacts, such as the destruction of human capital, social
institutions, and political stability. Reduction of social costs and an increase in resil-
ience to crisis require a broad approach in developing countries, spanning from the
creation of market insurance against job or income losses—for example, unemploy-
ment insurance and protections to individual savings of the poor—to self-protection
against becoming poor—for example, health maintenance and increased education [de
Ferranti et al., 2000; World Bank, 2000c]. The most important step that each develop-
ing country can take is to establish an institutional framework to minimize the risks
and severity of economic downturns at times of crises, and then respond to the par-
ticular needs of the poor during crises.
Policies include: collecting better information about the poor and their exposure
to economic risk; targeting of scarce fiscal subsidies on programs for the poor, espe-
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pro-poor focus, particularly in health and education; and establishing automatic pro-
grams—such as unemployment insurance or stay-in-school programs—which provide
more predictable institutional responses to economic downturn, regardless of cause.
These policies can be financed typically through loans made by the MDBs, such as
the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the Inter-American Development
Bank, and by bilateral donor countries—like the New Miyazawa Initiative that was
extended to cover fiscal needs for crisis resolution during the Asian crisis.
Pitfalls. During crises it is often difficult to give social policies the priority they
deserve because budgets tend to be under pressure. Moreover, loans by the regional
and MDBs to social programs during crises tend to be tied to IMF conditionality, and
it typically takes time for countries to reach an agreement with the IMF, which ham-
pers disbursements in these programs. Even when early disbursements are possible,
the lack of reliable institutions that effectively manage and oversee social spending
can reduce the impact of any program.
REGIONAL AND GLOBAL FRAMEWORK
Although most attention has focused on global and domestic policy reforms, devel-
oping an effective regional framework can help complement a new international finan-
cial architecture and strengthen domestic policy reforms. This is particularly the case
when economies in a region are interdependent in trade, FDI, financial flows, and
macroeconomic activity, as they are in East Asia.
Lesson 9: Improve mechanisms for crisis prevention, management, and
resolution at the regional level in a way consistent with improvements in the
global framework.
Because economic contagions tend to begin within a particular geographical area,
a regional framework for financial coordination to address crisis prevention, manage-
ment, and resolution is logical. An efficient cooperative framework for regional finan-
cial management can be designed to cope with currency crises, contagion, and simul-
taneous economic contraction.15 At the same time, such a regional framework must
be consistent with a global framework in order to secure efficient responses to crises
through proper financial management and crisis-resolution procedures. Because con-
tagion can spread globally, this framework must be developed and international credi-
tors from outside the region need to be involved, as well.
A framework for regional financial coordination may include four components:
policy dialogue for regional economic surveillance and monitoring; schemes to aug-
ment international liquidity in times of crisis; monetary and exchange rate policy
coordination; and programs to assist crisis-affected countries to resolve the systemic
impact of the crisis and accelerate the recovery process.
First, regional policy dialogue for economic surveillance/monitoring is instrumen-
tal to crisis/contagion prevention. The process should encourage information exchanges
on macroeconomic and structural issues, including fiscal, monetary, and exchange
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and promote “peer pressure” so as to induce good macroeconomic and structural poli-
cies that are conducive to stable external accounts and currencies. The East Asia
region has established several such forums, including the Manila Framework Group,
the ASEAN surveillance process, the ASEAN +3 Economic Review and Policy Dia-
logue (ERPD) process, and the Executives Meeting of East Asia-Pacific Central Banks
[Kuroda and Kawai, 2003]. The most active among these is ASEAN+3 (ten ASEAN
members plus China, Japan, and Korea), and its ERPD process focuses on regional
surveillance that is intended to apply peer pressure for better policy making among
the members.
Second, to contain the potential for regional contagion, avoid possible delays in
disbursements of international liquidity in times of crises, and augment globally avail-
able resources, a regional financing facility can play a complementary role. Such a
facility, however, needs to be designed to minimize moral hazard problems as well as
to be consistent with a global framework in order to ensure policy coherence and
exploit the synergy. The East Asia region has developed a network of currency swap
arrangements under the Chiang Mai Initiative, which may be invoked to support a
member currency that is under speculative attack, contagious impact, or in a crisis
situation.
Third, for economies that are highly competitive or integrated with one another
in trade, FDI, financial flows, and macroeconomic activity, intraregional exchange
rate stability is a public good due to the spillover effects. Intraregional exchange rate
stability requires the regional economies to develop greater exchange rate and mon-
etary policy coordination. The East Asia region has been slow, however, in developing
formal mechanisms to ensure intraregional exchange rate stability.
Fourth, in the face of a systemic crisis in the banking, corporate, and social sec-
tors, mobilizing fiscal resources is essential to resolving the crisis quickly. Fiscal resources
that are needed to recapitalize weak banks, facilitate corporate debt restructuring,
and increase social safety net spending may be limited due to the lack of domestic
fiscal headroom, lack of access to international capital markets, and lack of MDB
resource availability. Regionally concerted action to mobilize such resources, there-
fore, particularly from the core countries in a region, would contribute greatly to
crisis resolution if done consistently within global frameworks.16
Pitfalls. Setting up regional arrangements is not easy and has been opposed by
some members of the international financial system. For example, an early attempt
to set up an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) was met by strong opposition from the
United States and the IMF on grounds of perceived moral hazard and duplication.
They argued that an East Asian country hit by a currency crisis could bypass the
tough conditionality of the IMF and receive easy money from the AMF, thereby creat-
ing potential for moral hazard, and that an AMF would be redundant in the presence
of an effective global crisis manager, the IMF.
Though the idea of creating an AMF was abandoned, it is becoming increasingly
feasible. First, because of the high frequencies of emerging market crises, interna-
tional liquidity needs have expanded while the capacity of the IMF to lend has not
risen substantially. AMF resources can complement IMF resources. Second, regional
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a need to ensure stable intraregional exchange rates, and thus an institutional mecha-
nism for it. Third, East Asian economies are strengthening the regional surveillance
mechanism through ASEAN+3, which is expected to augment the region’s capacity to
analyze the risks of regional economies, formulate adjustment policies in the event of
crisis, and monitor the implementation of necessary policies. This could reduce the
moral hazard problem associated with AMF lending to a crisis country. Fourth, the
CMI may evolve into a more formal institution of reserve pooling. Fifth, potential
borrowers may have incentives to participate in the regional surveillance and peer
pressure process, because doing so would make them eligible to receive short-term
liquidity at the time of currency and balance of payments difficulties. Finally, China,
which was not supportive of the idea of creating an AMF in 1997, is now changing its
stance.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Financial crises in emerging market economies can originate either domestically
or externally, and either from bad fundamentals or herd behavior. Crises associated
with sharp reversals of capital flows are likely to be an enduring feature of the global
financial landscape for some time to come. This article has summarized what we
believe are the nine lessons from the East Asian crisis. If heeded by policy makers in
developing countries, rich countries, and international financial institutions, these
lessons could significantly reduce the frequency and damage from capital flow rever-
sals and contagion. The paper has also highlighted the lack of incentives and difficul-
ties in implementing these lessons, which might explain why some of these policies
have not been adopted. Recognizing that adopting the prescriptions here is easier said
than done, we believe the international community should study these issues in a
systematic way, nonetheless, to better prepare for prevention, management, and reso-
lution of future crises and contagion.
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1. Several authors have written on the causes of the Asian crisis and the roots of the recovery,
including Krugman [1998], World Bank [1998a, b], Eichengreen [1999], Hunter, Kaufman, and
Krueger [1999], Radelet and Sachs [2000], Lindgren et al. [2000], Drysdale [2000], Ito [2001], and
Yusuf [2003]. Some authors [Corsetti et al., 1999; International Monetary Fund (IMF), 1998a, b;
Krugman, 1998; and Summers, 1999] have emphasized the fact that the East Asian countries
financed unproductive investments because of implicit government guarantees and “crony capi-
talism.” Such unproductive investment tended to weigh down long-term growth rates and hence
generate vulnerabilities both in the real and financial sectors of the economies. At the same time,
the governments accumulated large contingent liabilities because of the need to protect depositors
of banks and other financial institutions. The strong trade linkages among these economies
helped to propagate the crisis throughout the region. Others—such as Furman and Stiglitz [1998],203 FINANCIAL CRISES: NINE LESSONS FROM EAST ASIA
Radelet and Sachs [1998a, 2000], Krugman [1999], and Kaminsky, Lyons, and Schmukler [2004]—
emphasize imperfections of the international financial markets as the major source of a crisis and
contagion. Whether because of its fundamental weaknesses or out of self-fulfilling expectations,
investors’ panic transmitted the crisis to other markets, and decided to pull their investments out
of these neighboring countries. In a world of self-fulfilling investor expectations, there exist
multiple equilibria.
2. Investor sentiment and perceptions were undoubtedly the main driver of contagion. This appears
to have two distinct elements. First, a common reaction to perceived problems and, second, a
common fear—irrespective of individual agent judgments about the perceived problems—of what
the herd of investors might do. In Korea, investors simultaneously came to note the risk of large
short-term external debt, relative to foreign exchange reserves, and began to sell the won, while
any individual investor could ignore the stampede only at his peril. In Indonesia, the collapse was
also driven by investor panic. In this case, domestic investors were scared by the haphazard
closure of the domestic banks and some news associated with President Soeharto’s ill health. The
politics of regime change added to the uncertainty in Korea, Indonesia, and Thailand and fed
investor panic. Malaysia did not have large short-term external debt or a grossly weak banking
sector (if perhaps somewhat overextended in real estate), and, without IMF financing, adopted
macroeconomic policies that were akin to those under IMF programs—tight monetary and fiscal
policies—at least until the spring of 1998. Beyond perceptions, the nature of bank finance also
propagated the contagion. For example, a shock in one country induced international commercial
banks to reduce exposure in other countries to protect the quality of their portfolios, thus propa-
gating shocks and crises across countries. That some Japanese, European, and Korean banks,
badly hit by the rupiah depreciation, were driven into distress or at minimum saw rapid deteriora-
tion in their portfolio quality, thereby reducing their bank exposure to the region, argues that they
were possible channels of contagion [Kaminsky and Reinhart, 2000].
3. Much the same could be said for Argentina after 1998, when fiscal policy turned sporadically
expansionary; the resulting larger borrowing led to higher debt ratios and subsequently higher
costs of capital—as external conditions worsened—and these factors in turn offset any minimally
short-run expansionary effects. See Perry and Servén [2002].
4. There is no one-size-fits-all solution. Though two corner solutions are not excluded, a more
realistic approach would be what Goldstein [2002] calls “managed floating plus.” This is a combina-
tion of “managed floating,” that is, a system with occasional intervention to limit excessive short-
term fluctuations in exchange rates without being accompanied by a publicly announced exchange
rate target, and “plus,” that is, inflation targeting and aggressive measures to reduce currency
mismatches. Measures to reduce currency mismatches include periodic announcements of the
size of short-term external debt (as a ratio of foreign exchange reserves), development of deeper
capital markets, and regulation on sovereign borrowing in foreign currencies. When a country has
diversified economic—trade, investment, etc.—relationships with the U.S., Japan, and Europe,
like those in East Asia, a system of using a basket of the U.S. dollar, the yen, and the euro, rather
than a single international currency, as a reference currency might have some benefits over a
simple peg. For more discussion on feasible exchange rate regimes see, among others, Frankel
[1998], Frankel et al. [2001], Kawai [2002], and de la Torre et al. [2003].
5. As has been argued in the above, however, even more important was the unwillingness of the
authorities to take early corrective action to adjust external imbalances when investor perceptions
began to shift against local assets and capital inflows began to attenuate.
6. Chile had unremunerated reserve requirements in place from 1991 until September 1998.
7. In addition, countries with large foreign exchange reserves and access to contingent liquidity
facilities will be able to inject liquidity in the system, avoiding credit squeeze and bank runs.
8. A corollary from Argentina is worth noting: ignoring lesson number one—which requires good
macroeconomic policies—even if you obey lesson number two—which requires a strong banking
sector—can spell disaster. After 1991, Argentina worked hard to improve its banks, their over-
sight, and the organization of the industry. By the eve of the crisis in 2000, they were widely
regarded as among the best in Latin America and perhaps the developing world. Nonetheless,
when the government managed poorly its response to severe external shocks, higher and unsus-
tainable public borrowing eventually led to a run against the peso, a freezing of deposits, and
eventually the abandonment of the currency board that caused a shock to bank balance sheets.
Government policy in managing the devaluation aggravated the shocks by trying to push the204 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
adjustment onto banks’ capital. Poorly managed macro trumps well-managed financial sectors
every time. See de la Torre et al. [2003].
9. Private debtors and creditors may expect that IMF financial interventions will reduce the risk of
lending and borrowing. As long as IMF liquidity support is required at times of crises, therefore,
private creditors and debtors should bear as fully as possible the consequences of the risks that
they have voluntarily assumed. IMF interventions should not bail them out.
10. Radelet and Sachs [1998a, b], Furman and Stiglitz [1998], and Stiglitz [1999a], among others,
discuss this point. Stiglitz [1999a], for example, argues that a high interest rate policy can cause
capital outflows and exchange rate depreciation, instead of capital inflows and currency apprecia-
tion, when it increases the probability of bankruptcies in the presence of highly indebted corpora-
tions that have large domestic currency debt servicing obligations. This would weaken domestic
banks’ balance sheets because corporations are their major clients and, thus, induce capital out-
flows in an anticipation of eventual currency depreciation.
11. Some governments may be compelled to try to escape this dilemma by invoking unilateral stand-
stills on external debt payments or thorough unorthodox policies that combine closing the capital
account and fixing the exchange rate. Malaysia adopted the latter, unorthodox policies in Septem-
ber 1998, without being accompanied by unfavorable consequences, partly because the program
was based upon conservative monetary and fiscal policies and its capital controls were short-lived.
See Kawai and Takagi [2003].
12. See Radelet and Sachs [1998a, b]. Stiglitz [1999b] argues that fiscal contraction during an East
Asian–type of crisis would be a beggar-thyself policy, which is worse than the beggar-thy-neighbor
policy of the 1930s. Fiscal contraction causes recession in the domestic economy and, as a result,
adversely affects the neighboring countries through trade linkages, which feeds back to the
domestic economy and magnifies the extent of recession through multiplier effects.
13. Argentina provides another corollary that large official financing might not be enough unless
government finances are in order. After 1997, the government did not reign in its fiscal deficit, but
increased expenditures somewhat for political reasons in 1998 and early 1999, by borrowing
abroad. As the economy continued to slide, however, the revenues slackened, the fiscal position
worsened, and rising debt levels began to make markets nervous, thereby raising borrowing costs
and worsening the cycle. In late 2000, the government approached the IMF for a new loan package
with a proposal for a large but minimally increasing fiscal deficit. The IMF, having learned the
virtues of Keynesian expansion in East Asia, offered to finance an even larger fiscal deficit, to
which the government readily agreed. But the markets read the agreement as “no fiscal adjust-
ment,” and the risk premium rose rather than declined on fears that Argentina would not meet
even these looser fiscal targets—which indeed they did not. The lesson here is that, when the
cause of the crisis is a large fiscal deficit, fiscal headroom is already exhausted, and public debt is
high and government credibility low, fiscal contraction cannot be avoided to bring confidence to
the markets.
14. An example is Korea’s external debt restructuring arrangement at the end of 1997 through the
beginning of 1998. The Korean government, representing the interest of the country’s commer-
cial banks, agreed with international bank creditors on a standstill, during which period they
negotiated to restructure external debt that was due shortly. The Korean government provided
guarantees for debt payment, and the governments of major industrialized countries convinced
their banks that the restructuring arrangements would be in their best interest. The restructur-
ing agreement restored the confidence not only in the currency market but also in the financial
system, providing a basis for the subsequent recovery.
15. Some countries generate more contagion effects than do other countries. Allocating resources to
only one country in the midst of a regional crisis might not be very effective, because other
neighboring countries may suffer contagion. Moreover, preventing and containing crises in the
countries that generate more spillover is relatively more effective at controlling regional and
global shocks.
16. An example is the so-called New Miyazawa Initiative, which was introduced in October 1998.
Under this Initiative, Japan pledged US$30 billion to support the economic recovery of the crisis-
affected East Asian countries. Half of the pledged amount was to be dedicated to short-term capital
needs during the process of implementing economic restructuring and reform, while the rest was
earmarked for medium-term and long-term reforms. A commitment to provide a large amount of
resources helped stabilize the regional markets and economies, thereby facilitating the recovery process.205 FINANCIAL CRISES: NINE LESSONS FROM EAST ASIA
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